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1 Introduction
This article examines why the quota system in
Brazil does not work. Drawing on qualitative
research conducted over a period of more than
ten years, it explores the extent to which the
quota increased the number of female candidates
for political office and whether there was a
corresponding increase in those elected, and the
impact of the quota in terms of the dynamics of
the parties and in the perception of its leaders
and members. In conducting this research, I have
sought to understand the experience of both
female and male party leaders, leaders of
organisations, members of political parties,
Federal and State Deputies and elected and non-
elected candidates, as well as trying to discover
the process beyond the quota system itself.
In looking at the Brazilian political structure and
its interaction with quotas, I start from the basic
premise, which I believe is almost consensual
here, of the inefficiency of our political system up
until now. Brazil is a federative, presidential
republic, with a bicameral parliamentary
representative system – Senate and Lower
Chamber – the formation of which is based on a
system of proportional representation (PR) in
each state.1 The voting system is based on an
open party list and the size of the districts varies
from a minimum of eight to a maximum of 70
representatives. I have analysed the following six
political parties since 1996 and this data forms
the basis of the article: Partido da Social
Democracia Brazileira (PSDB), Partido
Democratas (DEM), previously known as PFL,
Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), Partido
Democrático Trabalhista (PDT), Partido do
Movimento Democrático Brazileiro (PMDB) and
Partido Popular (PP), previously known as PPB.2
2 Quotas that stop working beyond a certain
point
In contrast to many other countries, the quota
system in Brazil does not work. Its first use saw
some increase in female candidates, but after a
while, its inefficiency became evident. Initially
the quota level was set at 20 per cent and was
only applied to the Camara de Vereadores
(municipal government) elections; in 1998, it
increased to 25 per cent and was extended to the
national Legislative Assembly and the Camara
de Deputados (Chamber of Deputies); and in
2000, it increased again to 30 per cent for each
level of legislative competition, with the
exception of the Senate (Araújo 2003).
Contrary to the views of many others, I believe
that the failure of the quota system in Brazil is
not only due to male resistance. Male resistance
is mediated by aspects of political pragmatism,
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which involves women as well as men when they
find themselves in the dynamics of electoral
politics and are called upon to decide which
strategies will result in success for their parties.
The quota law in Brazil defines, as a minimum,
30 per cent per sex of the total number of
candidates on electoral lists. However, the law
also states that the lists for each party can be up
to 150 per cent in relation to the number of seats
available for each state. Hence, the quota is
calculated on this total of 150 per cent and not
on the actual number of candidates for each
party. So an important fact to consider is that the
quota is calculated not on the actual list of
candidates, but on the potential list. Parties have
to leave 30 per cent of the seats vacant for
women and these seats cannot be filled by men.
But they are rarely if ever filled.
One of the conclusions, reached through an
examination of experiences of quota systems in
Latin America, is that sanctions are fundamental
for them to work well. Sanctions refer to the
aspects of quota law that oblige parties to fulfil
the percentage and the established formats.
Non-fulfilment should incur some sort of
punishment. In the majority of Latin American
countries, including Peru, Paraguay, Argentina,
Costa Rica and Bolivia, if the party does not fulfil
the requirements, they cannot participate in
elections. In countries where there is no
obligation attached to the law, the quota system
does not work (Araújo and García 2006). Brazil is
one such country. In the last three federal
elections in Brazil, not one single party filled
their lists of 150 per cent of candidates (Nicolau
2006). If the law continues to be interpreted as a
minimum of 30 per cent out of the potential total
of 150 per cent, the quota is not going to be
fulfilled, as the parties do not have that many
candidates. It needs to focus instead on effective
female candidates.
3 The less developed the region, the better the
chance of women getting elected
Where, then, are women succeeding in getting
elected to public office in Brazil? And how has
this come about? In this section, I present some
data on the Câmaras de Vereadores (municipal
government Chambers of Councillors), which
demonstrates that women are more likely to get
elected in the less developed regions of Brazil.
Table 1 shows the initial impact on the electoral
sphere for the Chamber of Councillors when the
quota law was introduced in 1998, but from 2000
onwards, we can see that the increase has been
marginal. For the most recent 2008 elections, the
total percentage of women elected remained
about the same at 12.5 per cent. If we look at the
different regions, we can see a pattern: the
Northern and Central-Eastern regions tend to
present more favourable results than the more
developed regions of the country.
The Legislative Assemblies and the Chamber of
Deputies tend to follow the same pattern of
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Table 1 Percentage of women candidates elected to Câmaras de Vereadores from 1996 to 2004
2004 2000 1996
Female Elected Female Elected Female Elected 
candidates female candidates female candidates female 
(%) candidates (%) candidates (%) candidates 
(%) (%) (%)
Northern Region 22.49 14.6 20.57 13.88 14.72 15.53
North-Eastern Region 21.73 14.63 18.55 13.09 12.1 12.96
Central-Eastern Region 22.34 13.48 19.78 12.93 16.69 13.27
South-Eastern Region 22.72 10.7 19.46 10.09 9.48 8.72
Southern Region 21.08 11.43 18.26 10.29 8.72 10.04
Total Brazil 20.63 12.6 19.40 11.6 10.87 11.1
Source Data from Tribunal Superior Eleitoral – Brazil (TSE) (Superior Electoral Court).
achieving higher numbers for women in the less
developed regions. This again underlines the
importance of moving away from only focusing
on arguments around ‘male resistance’ and
‘prejudice and discrimination’, because, contrary
to the relationship between variables such as
literacy, income and Human Development Index
(HDI) and equality between sexes, discussed in
much of the literature, the Brazilian data
suggests an inversion. In many of the less
developed states, with lower literacy rates, there
is more support for the traditional parties and
less for new or smaller parties; and in the states
where fewer women work, there appears to be a
greater chance of women being elected. Alves
and colleagues’ (2005) study on the
municipalities in Brazil shows this same pattern.
The ten municipalities that elected the most
women were situated predominantly in the
North and North-Eastern regions and in general,
were less developed. This appears to
demonstrate that women statistically get better
results in states and municipalities defined by
certain variables as ‘less developed’, and the
political parties that have the highest number of
women elected are the bigger and more
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Table 2 States with more or less elected female candidates 1994 and 2006
State 1994 State 1998
Female Elected female Female Elected female
candidates (%) candidates (%) candidates (%) candidates (%)
Roraima (+) 14.29 16.65 (3º) Roraima (+) 20 16.67 (7º)
Rio de Janeiro (+) 9.54 18.57 (2º) Tocantins (+) 18.84 8.33 (17º)
Rondônia (+) 9.54 20.83 (1º) Distrito Federal (+) 18.24 16.67 (5º)
Distrito Federal (+) 9.22 8.33 (10º) Rondônia (+) 17.31 8.33 (16º)
Santa Catarina (–) 2.31 2.50 (23º) Espírito Santo (–) 7.72 3.33 (25º)
Espírito Santo (–) 3.81 6.67 (16º) Mato Grosso (–) 8.57 4.17 (23º)
Amazonas (–) 4.29 4.17 (19º) R.G. Norte (–) 9.9 16.67 (6º)
Mato Grosso (–) 4.41 8.33 (11º) Santa Catarina (–) 10 6.00 (22º)
Brazil 7.18 7.85 Brazil 12.94 10.01
State 2002 State 2006
Female Elected female Female Elected female 
candidates (%) candidates (%) candidates (%) candidates (%)
Tocantins (+) 22.3 8.33 (19º) Distrito Federal (+) 20.81 12.5 (11º)
Roraima (+) 22.13 12.50 (14º) Tocantins (+) 17.56 12.5 (13º)
Amazonas (+) 19.14 4.17 (24º) Amapá (+) 17.37 12.5 (9º)
Distrito Federal (+) 19.02 20.83 (3º) Rio de Janeiro(+) 17.26 14.29 (7º)
Piauí (–) 8.08 6.67 (22º) Mato Grosso (–) 6.95 4.17 (24º)
R.G. do Sul (–) 9.07 3.64 (27°) Goiás (–) 8.88 17.07 (3°)
Goiás (–) 10.16 17.07 (7°) Paraíba (–) 9.05 11.11 (16º)
Mato Grosso (–) 10.93 4.17 (25°) R.G. do Norte (–) 9.88 16.67(5º)
Brazil 14.84 12.56 Brazil 14.12 11.61
Source Author with data from TSE. (Note: figures in brackets represent rank order in terms of proportion of women
elected, where 1º is the top place and 27º the bottom).
traditional ones. The smaller parties, both on the
left and right, are generally more open to the
participation of women as candidates, but
proportionally, it is not where they do best.
4 More women candidates does not mean more
women winning
As we have seen from the previous section, the
number of female candidates increased rapidly,
especially in 1998, the first year the quota system
was adopted, but after this, women did not really
manage to increase their presence in elections.
In the 2006 federal elections, there was even a
reduction in the percentage of female
candidates. The next Federal election will be
held in October 2010, and it will be interesting to
see the outcome in terms of any change in the
percentages of female candidates contesting the
election or winning seats.
Elections to State Legislative Assemblies also
take place every four years, with the next
election due this year. Table 2 shows the States
with the largest and smallest numbers of female
candidates and the respective number of those
elected from 1994 to 2006 to State Legislative
Assemblies. If we take 2006, for example, the
data shows it was not necessarily the states with
the highest number of female candidates that
elected the most women and vice versa, so there
does not appear to be a direct relationship
between the increase of women candidates and
the possibility of their being elected.
Similarly for the Chamber of Deputies at the
Federal level, Figure 1 shows the change in
numbers of women candidates and those elected
between 1994 and 2006. In 1994, the percentage
of candidates and those successfully elected were
on a par. In 1998, there was a substantive
increase of close to 50 per cent in terms of
candidates. It was not ideal, but it was good
progress. At the same time, the numbers of those
elected lowered. In 2002, both categories
increased. This was however, more likely due to
other circumstances at that time, such as the
Workers’ Party leader Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
being elected President, and an increase in the
number of seats for the Left having an impact on
the profile of who was elected, than actually
down to the quota system itself.
It is important to note that the percentages seem
to reach a plateau, beyond which they stabilise in
terms of the number of candidates. In 2006, the
number of female candidates and females elected
remained around the same as they had in 2002.
My analysis of the statistical regression in terms
of women candidates compared with women
elected suggests that there is a concentration of
potential for election at the level of 10–15 per
cent of female candidates; following this, there is
what I call the ‘ceiling of competition’, i.e. an
increase in female candidates does not result in
an increase in those elected.
Initially, there was a very positive impact for
some of the parties, e.g. the PFL/DEM, PSDB
and PMDB; but for the PDT and PT who have
more of a tradition of women’s organisation, the
impact was not so significant. For these parties,
we can also see that the variations in the number
of women elected do not correspond to the
variations in the number of candidates. In other
words, there are many other factors that we need
to consider.
In Table 3, we can see that the parties that
fielded the largest number of female candidates
are the smallest parties. However, the only one of
them that achieved an excellent proportional
result was the Partido Comunista do Brasil (i.e.
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Figure 1 Evolution of the percentages of female candidates and elected female candidates
Source Author with data from TSE.
the PC do B). After the PC do B, the party with
the best results was the Partido da Reedificação
da Ordem Nacional (PRONA). We can conclude
that it is not necessarily the parties that put up
the most female candidates that will have a
correspondingly higher number of females
elected. However, it is also important to note
that the big Parties are often in the middle in
terms of percentage of female candidates, but
the women who run for them have a much
greater chance of being elected (Araújo and
Alves 2007).
5 Smaller districts mean better results for women
The data from the States, when analysed by size,
are also revealing. In Brazil, a district is the
same as a geographical State. Although there is
some variation, in general, the large districts are
classified as those having 30 seats or more in the
Chamber; medium-sized districts between 11
and 29 seats; and small districts, ten seats or less
(the minimum is eight Deputies per state)
(Soares and Rennó 2006). However, the Brazilian
case goes against the dominant literature. The
majority of studies which look at electoral
districts indicate that the bigger the district or
larger the number of seats available, the better
the performance of women. But in Brazil, women
have obtained better results in the smaller
districts. From Table 4 we can see that this
relationship was less significant in 1994, but then
became clearer in 1998, 2002 and 2006.
The success rate measures the proportion of
female candidates and those elected compared
with the proportion of male candidates and those
elected, multiplied by 100. In Table 4 we can see
that every number over 100 means that women
were more successful than men and vice versa. In
general, women get worse results, but even so,
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Table 3 Parties who launched and elected female candidates 1994–2006
Party 1994 Parties 1998
Female Elected female Female Elected female 
candidates (%) candidates (%) candidates (%) candidates (%)
PRONA (+) 25.58 0 PCB (+) 40 0
PSTU (+) 22.73 0 PCO (+) 25 0
PC do B (+) 18.18 20(2°) PC do B (+) 22.5 28.57 (1°)
PCB (–) 0 0 PGT (–) 0 0
PRTB (–) 0 0 PAN (–) 0 0
PTB (–) 1.55 0 PPS (–) 4.96 0
Note: 21 parties did not elect any. Note: 23 parties did not elect any.
Parties 2002 Parties 2006
Female Elected female Female Elected female 
candidates (%) candidates (%) candidates (%) candidates (%)
PCB (+) 28.57 0 PC do B (+) 23.61 38.46 (2°)
PC do B (+) 21.57 33.33 (1°) PRONA (+) 19.85 50.0 (1°)
PSTU (+) 17.78 0 PCB (+) 18.75 0
PSN/PHS (–) 4.94 0 PSL (–) 4.04 0
PPB (–) 5.45 2.04(11°) PRP (–) 7.14 0
PTN (–) 6.12 0 PRB (–) 9.52 0
Note: 19 parties did not elect any. Note: 16 parties did not elect any.
Source Author with data from TSE.
the rates are better in the smaller districts. The
smaller states have 22.8 per cent of the seats in
parliament, with 15 per cent of these being taken
by women, they also have 15 per cent of the
electorate. The larger states (those with more
than 30 Deputies) have 46.6 per cent of the
seats, but only 6.7 per cent are occupied by
women. These states make up 65 per cent of the
electorate.
When we look at the ranking of the states in
Table 5, we observe that the State of Sergipe
fielded the largest number of female candidates
for the Chamber of Deputies in 2006, equating to
24.5 per cent of the total number of candidates
put forward. However, not one woman was
elected there. There were 12 female candidates
fielded by 11 parties and out of the 11, only two
were medium-sized or big parties (the PT and the
PDT), which provide a better chance of getting
elected. Among the four states with the highest
percentages of female candidates, only one was
also among those with the largest percentage of
women elected (i.e. Acre).
The conclusion we can draw is that there does
not appear to be a direct relationship between
the percentage of female candidates fielded and
their probability of winning the elections.
In looking at electoral density (the number of
candidates per available seats), there appears to
be a great deal of variation. The southern cities
of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, the most
populous city in Brazil, had the highest densities
of candidates in the 2006 Federal elections, yet
while Rio de Janeiro did reasonably well in terms
of the proportion of women elected, the results
for São Paulo were very poor. In other words, the
total amount of candidates in any one district
does not necessarily either facilitate or impede
women’s election.
6 Some final observations
The initial impact of the quotas was reproduced,
but not multiplied. The lack of candidates to run
for election is the same for all the parties
analysed and is true for both women and men.
For the majority of the women I interviewed, it
became clear that their trajectories were
independent of the existence of the quota law
and they created their own path.
Re-election is another important issue to reflect
on. In the most recent election, 47 per cent or 243
Deputies were re-elected from the previous term,
and 200 of these occupy legislative or judicial
political positions. Only 43 Deputies were
completely new to politics and they divide within
the following categories: communicators, bishops
or evangelical pastors and relatives of other
politicians. Politics still has very elitist overtones.
In the case of the religious group, evangelical
pastors have been increasing their political
candidature, but the majority of churches still do
not accept women as leaders, i.e. bishops or
pastors. They are the most common type of
candidate. So we have to ask ourselves where can
women create their political trajectories?
Both the male and female party leaders I
interviewed identified less of an adherence
among both women and men to party ideology.
There seems to be a lack of trust in politics and
this is something that prevails on the Left, Right,
and Centre. The crisis in participation within
movements and political associations, one of the
paths through which one enters institutional
politics, will impact on the construction of
political capital and trajectories for women.
Has the quota system changed the electoral
engineering and who is chosen for candidature?
From the over 100 interviews I conducted, the
criteria for being on the ‘real’ list, without being
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Table 4 Success rate of electoral districts according to size
Districts 1994 1998 2002 2006
Large 106.84 49.93 74.23 60.38
Medium 64.84 39.07 47.8 46.39
Small 117.41 68.05 86.41 98.29
Total 98.35 52.01 69.32 65.14
Source Author with data from TSE.
just ‘oranges’ are: electoral representation,
political capital, political trajectory or partisan
political trajectory acknowledging some sort of
electoral visibility, regions of the state so that
there are enough votes to form coalitions,
electoral alliances, local and or regional, and
finally there are always vacancies for those who
believe that for some reason or other they could
be elected.
Candidates who were elected, in general, did not
report any difficulty in being accepted by their
party. However, with the exception of free
television time, there is no official money for
election campaigns, the funds are collected by
the parties and distributed according to
priorities, and costs are very high. This is an
obstacle within Brazilian politics, as women
especially have fewer resources and less access to
finance than men.
There are two possible scenarios for moving
forward. The first is to maintain the current
legislation of open lists, with the possibility of
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Table 5 Percentage of female candidates and females elected by state – 2006
State Female candidates (%) Female candidates elected (%)
Acre 15.7 12.5
Alagoas 11.8 0
Amapá 14.7 50
Amazonas 12.7 25
Bahia 7.3 10.26
Ceará 8.2 4.55
Distrito Federal 14.9 0
Espírito Santo 20.2 40
Goiás 6.8 11.8
Maranhão 11.4 5.6
Mato Grosso 17.7 25
Mato Grosso do Sul 21.6 0
Minas Gerais 10.2 5.7
Pará 15.7 11.8
Paraíba 6.7 11.8
Paraná 9.8 0
Pernambuco 11.8 4
Piauí 4.8 0
Rio de Janeiro 13.6 13.4
R.G. do Sul 11.4 9.7
R.G. do Norte 11.3 25
Rondônia 16.4 12.5
Roraima 15.7 25
Santa Catarina 10.5 6.3
São Paulo 14.4 4.3
Sergipe 24.5 0
Tocantins 22.2 12.5
introducing some reform measures such as
sanctions and setting the quota rate on the
number of actual candidates, not the potential
number. The second is to change the electoral
system so that party lists are closed and, in which
case, the rotation of seats (between men and
women) becomes essential. Without rotation,
women tend to stay at the bottom of the list.
Irrespective of which scenario to opt for, the
issue of addressing public financing of campaigns
has to be confronted in order to remove the
inequities it has generated. Closely associated
with that is the need to better understand the
processes and dynamics of women candidates’
access to campaign finances within the parties.
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Notes
1 For information on the general characteristics
of the Brazilian political and electoral system,
see Araújo (2003 and 2006).
2 These were the main political parties in Brazil
in 1996.
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